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This appeal challenges the illegal jury verdict, and the Judge's failure to grant a new trial, 
additur or JNOV. It also addresses the failure to require that Dr. Harper be provided the trial 
Record at public expense. 
IMPORTANT COMMENTS REGARDING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Ms. Seamons attempts to side-step all of the arguments on appeal, using the circular 
reasoning that since Dr. Harper could not afford ( and therefore did not provide) a transcript of 
the trial, all errors and injustices should be ignored. As discussed more fully elsewhere, most of 
the issues are actually clear merely from a look at the Clerk's Record, which was provided. Of 
course a primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court (and this one) should have ordered that 
the transcript be provided for Dr. Harper, an indigent under the applicable statute. However, 
there is also solid reason requiring reversal that does not even require an examination of the 
Record. 
In their briefing the parties have continued to be in agreement that Ms. Seamons ran a red 
light, and T-boned Dr. Harper. She never accepted full responsibility for her negligence, so the 
matter had to be put to the jury. The jury found that she was at fault, and that Dr. Harper was 
without fault. 
Although in her brief, for the first time, Ms. Seamons makes the awkward argument that 
maybe Dr. Harper had no injury that caused him discomfort, there is no serious issue or 
contention: both sides have always agreed (and did throughout trial) that he was injured in the 
car crash. They simply disagree about how much. Even "Independent" (read: defense hired) 
medical examiners Dr. Wilson and Dr. Greenwald did not claim he was uninjured in the 
collision. Ms. Seamons is left with the necessity, to survive the appeal, of asserting no pain or 
discomfort could have occurred. 
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Ms. Seamons, who makes much throughout her brief of the fact that there is no full trial 
transcript, makes a point of informing the Court that after the officer at the accident scene 
"questioned all the parties and did not issue any citations." Respondent's Brief, p. 3. Is she now 
challenging the jury's determination that, despite her failure to take responsibility, Ms. Seamons 
was solely at fault? There has been no cross appeal, so it is questionable at best that she would 
make a point out of the police officer issuing no citation. It is all the more ironic in light of her 
drumbeat of failure to provide a transcript, since this statement, like her others, is supported by 
no transcript. She has the same ability to provide a transcript as does Dr. Harper. 
After several days of trial, the parties agree, the jury returned a special verdict, finding 
defendant 100% liable for the collision. R. 258-60. On the same verdict form, however, the jury 
awarded $4,100 for economic damages, ROA 9, and $0 for noneconomic damages, including 
pain and suffering. R. 258-60; ROA 9. The parties, of course, do not dispute this. See, e.g., 
Respondent's Brief, p. 2. 
Dr. Harper's motions for new trial, JNOV, etc., were denied. So was his Motion and 
Affidavit for Fee Waiver for the cost of the transcript on appeal (the trial judge recommending 
denial and this Court following the recommendation). 
Dr. Harper does not concede the accuracy of the Statement of Facts in Respondent's 
Brief As acknowledged on page 3 of that Brief, the statement is merely a collection reciting Ms. 
Seamons' version of the facts. Judge Goff "adopt[ ed]" Seamons' "analysis of the evidence," for 
"efficiency purposes." Id., p. 3; R. 335. He did not adopt her set of facts. And it would have 
been improper for him to have done so. If Ms. Seamons wishes to argue the facts, a new trial 
would be a perfect opportunity. 
For some reason, as part of her Statement of Facts, Ms. Seamons states, "Plaintiffs 
Counsel failed to specifically request damages based upon pain and suffering or other 
noneconomic damages." Respondent's Brief p. 6. On the contrary, there was extensive 
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argument in closing and throughout the trial regarding the pain, disabilities, surgery, depression, 
lost memory, tinnitus, hyperacusis, headache, weakness, drooping, difficulty singing, and more. 
There is no requirement that a dollar amount for noneconomic damages be requested in 
argument, and in fact it is within the jury's purview to put a dollar amount on pain, suffering, and 
the like. 
As a final note, Ms. Seamons' "Statement of Facts," which covers pages 3 to 6 of 
Respondent's Brief, are unsupported by the Record. Respondent, represented as she is by an 
insurance company, can afford a transcript, and had the same opportunity to get one as did Dr. 
Harper. Interestingly, despite 4 pages, single-spaced of supposed "facts," the Court is not 
directed to any professional or other witness or piece of evidence to show that Dr. Harper 
suffered no injury, or suffered no pain, from the subject collision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Now that Ms. Seamons has again shown her hand by her Response Brief, it is clear that 
she is saddled with defending a jury verdict that is invalid, internally inconsistent, and subject to 
mandatory reversal. This conclusion can be reached even without a transcript. Ms. Seamons' 
Respondent's Brief does not even mention I.R.C.P. 49(b) (much less distinguish or explain it), 
the controlling rule on Special Verdicts, and their need to be internally consistent. To remedy the 
flawed verdict, and the fact that damages are inadequate, the trial court should have granted a 
new trial, an additur, or JNOV as to damages, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b ), 59(a)(l ), 59(a)(2), 
59(a)(5), 59(a)(6), 59(a)(7), and 59.1 and 60. 
Ms. Seamons is unable to justify admission of evidence not produced before trial, not 
admitted as an exhibit and not preserved in the Record, and to exclude certain medical evidence. 
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As an indigent person under the law, Dr. Harper should have been exempted from 
payment for the trial transcripts. 
Dr. Harper will only respond to issues raised in Respondent's Brief For brevity, items 
discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, but not responded to in Respondent's Brief, may not be 
treated here. No waiver or withdrawal of points or arguments should be inferred. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Jury's Verdict Form is Legally Invalid. As a verdict form with 
interrogatories, it is subject to I.R.C.P. 49(b ). Its internal and facial inconsistency is contrary to 
the rules, and is a clear violation of the court's instructions. Ms. Seamons' response to the facial 
invalidity of the Verdict is very limited. See, Respondent's Brief, pp. 19-20. It does not cite to 
or explain the clear language of I.R.C.P. 49(b), which is perhaps the most specific language 
requiring reversal and retrial. I.R.C.P. 49 is not even mentioned in the Respondent's Brief Yet 
LR.C.P. 49(b) is the authority for special verdicts, 1 and provides the limitations on them. 
When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the court shall direct the entry 
of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers. When the answers are 
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, 
the court may direct the entry of judgment in accordance with the answers, 
notwithstanding the general verdict or may return the jury for further 
consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. 
I.R.C.P. 49(b) (emphasis supplied). In this case, it is easy to see that the jury's answers to the 
court's interrogatories are not consistent: not with each other, and not with their instructions. 
They found that Ms. Seamons, through her fault, harmed Dr. Harper, and awarded special 
damages. They awarded no general damages. 
1 "The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories 
upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such 
explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to 
render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general 
verdict." I.R.C.P. 49(6). 
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2. The Baldwin Case is Inapplicable. Ms. Seamons' answer to the idea of an 
invalid verdict is to cite to a 1949 case in which the Court suggested that attacks on the verdict 
should be made when it is returned. Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 180, 204 P.2d 430, 432 
(1949). That case is not at all applicable, for at least the following reasons: 
~ There the personal injury plaintiff was awarded no damages at all. Here there 
were damages awarded, but none for pain, suffering or other general damages. 
~ Baldwin was issued before the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. It 
arose during code pleading, and was based upon old statutory law.2 
~ There was no request for special findings. Here both parties request special 
interrogatories. 
~ Contributory negligence, which has been superseded in Idaho by comparative 
negligence, was a was an outcome determinative jury issue in that case. 
~ In Baldwin, the court noted that a finding of no damages was justifiable by 
contributory negligence law: 
Though the negligence of a defendant may be a proximate cause of injuries to the 
plaintiff, such plaintiff cannot recover if the evidence further shows his own 
negligence was also a proximate cause of such injuries. No question has been 
raised as to the correctness of the above instruction, and under it, and the evidence 
bearing on the question, the jury was justified in its verdict denying any recovery 
by the plaintiff. The effect of granting a new trial in this case was to override the 
verdict of the jury which was supported by sufficient evidence, and authorized by 
the above instruction. The order of the court granting a new trial should, therefore, 
be vacated and set aside and the judgment reinstated. 
2 Baldwin states the following, which is at least as helpful to Dr. Harper as to Ms. Seamons: "A jury is only required 
to find as to ultimate facts; and if it finds that plaintiff is entitled to recover, to fix the amount of recovery. If the 
finding is that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, the verdict should be for defendant. Where, as here, the jury finds 
that plaintiff is entitled to recover "$ none," it is in fact and in law a finding for the defendant. Where, as here, the 
jury finds that plaintiff is entitled to recover"$ none," it is in fact and in law a finding for the defendant." Baldwin, 
supra. 
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Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 182, 204 P.2d 430, 434 ( 1949) ( emphasis in original). The case 
has no application here. 
Far from Dr. Harper having waived the challenge to the verdict, it is Ms. Seamons who 
has waived the issue. See, Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 438 
(2007), a motor vehicle personal injury case. After discussing the old Baldwin case, supra, the 
Court focused the fact that, like here, the respondent did not raise the issue of waiver for failure 
to object at the time the verdict was returned. 
:\fore importantly, at the time the district court heard arguments on Crowley's motion for 
new trial, or in the alternative additur, Critchfield did not argue that the issue of an 
inconsistent verdict was waived when Crowley did not object to the verdict at the time it 
was returned. Since this Court has consistently held that we will not consider issues that 
were not presented to the district court, but rather are raised for the first time on appeal, 
this Court will not consider Critchfield's argument that inconsistency in the verdict 
is not grounds for a new trial. 
Crowley, supra,145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435,438 (2007) (emphasis supplied). The trial 
court's grant of a new trial, based primarily on failure to award general damages, was affirmed. 
This Court and the Court of Appeals recently confirmed that matters raised for the first time on 
appeal will not be considered. Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 432,247 P.3d 659, 663 (2011); Drinkall v. 
Drinkall, 150 Idaho 606,249 P.3d 405,413 (Id. App. 2011). 
3. Cramer ,md Tiegs support a new trial. Ms. Seamons claims that the case of 
Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 880-81, 204 P .3d 508, 520-21 (2009), supports her claim that 
the verdict may not be attacked. Respondent's Brief, p. 19. However, Cramer strongly favors 
reversal and new trial here. See discussion below. 
Bottom line: Ms. Seamons has failed to explain just how a jury can find her entirely 
liable for injuries to Dr. Harper, and award him medical expense, but then award nothing for 
noneconomic losses. LR.C.P. 49(b) is a separate, clear basis for reversing the trial court's failure 
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to order a new trial or JNOV. The jury having clearly erred, it was reversible error in turn for the 
trial judge to leave the verdict and its underlying form uncorrected and invalid. Tiegs v. 
Robertson, 149 Idaho 482,236 P.3d 474,478 (Idaho App. 2010). 
Yt:s. Seamons claims that the Tiegs decision is unhelpful to Dr. Harper. She is mistaken. 
While the procedural status was slightly different in that case than in this one, both involved 
inconsistent verdict entries. The judge there found the jury's responses to the special 
interrogatory as to proximate cause were inconsistent with the apportionment of fault, and the 
damage award. Tiegs quoted the Cramer case as follows: 
This Court finds that the jury's verdict is inconsistent and beyond reasonable 
reconciliation. The jury contradicts itself throughout the findings. [Cramer] properly 
objected when the verdict was returned and asked the court to have the jury reconcile the 
verdict. The court declined to do so and this Court cannot reasonably reconcile the 
verdict. This Court reverses the judgment and grants [Cramer's] motion for a new trial. 
Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 880-81, 204 P.3d 508, 520-21 (2009), quoted with approval in 
Tiegs, supra, 149 Idaho 482,236 P.3d @480. 
In granting the motion for a new trial, the district court ruled that the findings by the jury 
that [defendants'] negligence were not proximate causes of Tiegs' death and injuries were 
inconsistent with the jury's apportionment of fault and money damages and since this 
inconsistency could not be reconciled, Tiegs was entitled to a new trial. We conclude that 
such a determination conforms to the applicable legal standards and was not an abuse of 
discretion .... 
[I]n this case, the contradictory findings by the jury can only lead to the conclusion that 
the verdict cannot be reasonably reconciled-thus granting the court discretion under IRCP 
49(b) to grant a new trial. In addition, as in Cramer, the grant of a new trial was 
appropriate under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) because the verdict was "against the law" since 
proving liability for damages requires proof that the liable party was a proximate cause of 
the injury." Id. 
Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236 P.3d 474, 479 (Idaho App. 2010). Since the verdict 
conflicts with IRCP 49(6), it is "against the law" under I.R.C.P. 59(7). 
Because Ms. Seamons claims that the Cramer and Tiegs cases do not help Dr. Harper, 
they are summarized as follows: 
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Tiegs v. Robertson. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of a new trial based on an 
internally inconsistent verdict. In a comparative negligence wrongful death case, the jury had 
found that a defendant had been negligent in operating his vehicle, but the negligence was not a 
proximate cause of the death, and yet attributed a percentage of negligence to both sides, and 
awarded only $2,500. This was an invalid verdict. 149 Idaho 482, 236 P.3d 474, 479 (Idaho 
App. 2010). 
Cramer v. Slater. Because of inconsistencies in the damages portion of the verdict form, 
a new trial was appropriate and the Court reversed the denial of a motion for a new trial. The 
verdict was irreconcilable, because it found liability in an agent, but found none in the master, 
and because the jury awarded economic damages and found that there had been emotional harm, 
but then awarded no general damages. 146 Idaho 868, 204 P.3d 508 (2009). 
Ms. Seamons' rationale for Cramer being inapplicable to this case is weak enough that it 
underscores just how on point it is. See generally, Respondent's Brief, pp. 21-22. She merely 
points out, without relevance to this case, that Cramer notes that under the right circumstances, it 
is permissible for a jury to find that the jury failed to meet its burden as to non-economic 
damages. However, the quote is, with respect, cherry-picked. Placed in context, the Cramer 
court reasons as follows: 
The jury's award of only economic damages is curious, troubling and potentially 
inconsistent. ... Although it is permissible for a jury to find that the Plaintiff failed to 
meet the burden of proving non-economic damages, it is curious how a jury could find 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and then not compensate [her] for any of the 
emotional distress she suffered .... This Court holds that the inconsistencies in the 
verdict form and the jury's findings are irreconcilable and the motion for a new 
trial should have been granted. 
Cramer, supra, 146 Idaho @ 882, 204 P.3d @ 521 (emphasis added). Likewise, here it is 
troubling and inconsistent to find an injury, as the jury did here, but award nothing for it. A new 
trial was appropriate in Cramer. Id., 146 Idaho 880, 204 P.3d@ 520, quoted with approval by 
Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482,236 P.3d 474 (Idaho App. 2010). 
4. A new trial or JNOV was necessary. The trial court should have granted a new 
trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b ), based on the finding that 
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Ms. Seamons damaged Mr. Harper by her negligence, awarding an arbitrary $4,100 for special 
damages, and nothing for general damages. 
To award special damages, the jury must necessarily (under law and the instructions) 
have found that at least $4,100 of the treatment was necessary and reasonable. For the jury to 
have determined that $4,100 ( or any positive amount) was necessary and reasonable treatment 
arising out of Ms Seamons' negligence, which of necessity they did, means there was an injury 
requiring such treatment. 
A decision to grant a new trial is within the trial judge's sound discretion. See, Tiegs v. 
Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236 P.3d 474 (Idaho App. 2010). In considering a new trial motion, 
the court is not required to view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Quick v. Crane, 
111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). 
5. Efforts to Prop Up or Justify the Verdict are Inadequate. In arguing that 
JNOV was not required, Ms. Seamons recites some of the jury instructions given. Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 12-13. This begs the point, since what the jury did here defied the jury instructions, in 
addition to logic. 
In another shot at explaining away the inconsistent verdict, Ms. Seamons states that it is 
"clear" that the jury did not find Dr. Harper credible. Respondent's Brief, p. 13. However, as 
evidence for this she cites only (and oddly) to her own Statement of Facts. Id. Similarly, she 
argues that since at the scene of the collision he noted no symptoms, there could not have been 
injury. That is contrary to all medical witnesses who addressed the matter, on both sides. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 13. 
Again trying to find a reason for the strange verdict, Ms. Seamons guesses that Dr. 
Harper may have hurt himself by engaging in injurious activities after the accident. The one 
example she uses, though, is "overworking" himself by carrying newspapers. Respondent's 
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Brief; p. 14. Likewise, she actually speculates that while "all of the medical experts agreed 
that Appellant may have experienced a whiplash," that didn't mean that he necessarily had 
pain and suffering. Id.,@ 16 (emphasis supplied). A whiplash without pain or suffering? Yet, 
this is would have to be the conclusion to justify the verdict. 
Of key interest in this case is Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 
438 (2007). There the judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding a new trial or additur. The 
reasons for a new trial in Crowley are quite similar to the problems here. The personal injury 
plaintiff was awarded no pain and suffering damages. Like here, until the appeal the defendant 
did not claim there was no pain and suffering at all. 
(1) Critchfield presented no evidence to dispute pain and suffering, (2) clearly, some 
pain and suffering was experienced, (3) Critchfield presented no evidence to support 
other causes of the injuries, and (4) the jury awarded an arbitrary amount in 
damages that failed to include any non-economic damages even though it is obvious 
from the record that at least some pain and suffering existed. 
Crowley, supra, 145 Idaho 509,512, 181 P.3d 435 (emphasis supplied). The similarities to what 
the jury did in this case are striking. 
Ms. Seamons alludes in somewhat of a "drive-by" manner, to a supposed failure to 
mitigate damages. Respondent's Brief; p. 13. This hasn't come up since her Answer was filed 5 
years ago. Raising it now is apparently to provide an excuse for the jury's inconsistent verdict. 
However, there was absolutely no discussion or evidence on the matter of mitigation, or 
suggestion of how he failed to mitigate. In fact, as noted on pages 3 to 6 (Statement of Facts), if 
anything her claim has always been ( and still is) that Dr. Harper sought too much care, not too 
little. 
In yet another swipe at justifying the verdict, Ms. Seamons engages in rank speculation as 
to what the jury's intent in awarding special damages "could" be. Respondent's Brief; p. 15. 
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She supposes that it might be for diagnostics ($4,100 worth without any discomfort to indicate 
it?) which, without support, she states is "common" after an accident. Then she guesses that it 
might have been damages to repair the vehicle. Id. This is impossible, since repair of damage to 
the vehicle was never an issue at trial, and was not requested, having been long since handled by 
the insurer. In fact, medical expenses and costs were the only special damages argued or put 
into evidence. 
Ms. Seamons cites to Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 191 P.3d 489 (2008) as supporting 
the award of no general damages. However, Hei (a case of consensual sexual conduct between a 
a high school student and a teacher) was distinct from this case in at least the following ways: 
;.- It involved an award of no damages of any kind. Here there were special damages 
awarded (albeit in an arbitrary amount), and injury was found, but no general damages. 
;.- In Hei there was no evidence of any special damages even offered in evidence. 
;.- Hei offered no legal support for her claims that the verdict was invalid. Hei, supra, 191 
Idaho@494. 
;.- On the JNOV issue, her entire argument consisted just two sentences. Id. 
Hei is extremely narrow, and neither helpful nor applicable. To apply it here would be an 
example of bad cases making bad law. 
6. The Verdict is Based on Passion or Prejudice. Idaho Code 6-807 is also 
applicable, since the verdict here arises in a negligence case. It focuses on the option of an 
additur. 
( 1) In all civil actions in which there has been an award of damages as herein defined, the 
trial judge may, in his discretion, and after considering all of the evidence, alter such 
portion of the award representing damages if the amount awarded; (a) is unsupported or 
unjustified by the clear weight of the evidence; or (b) is so unreasonably 
disproportionate to the loss or damage suffered or to be suffered as to be 
unconscionable or so as to shock the conscience of the court; or (c) is the product of a 
legal error or mistake during the presentation of the evidence or submission of the case to 
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the trier of fact; or ( d) is demonstrated to be more likely than not the product of passion 
or prejudice on the part of the trier of fact. 
(2) If the court finds that the award of damages is unreasonably great or small by reason 
of any one or more of the factors set forth above, then the district court may exercise its 
discretion to reduce or increase such award in order to make the same consistent with the 
losses as shown by the evidence. In the event that the court shall enter any such order, it 
shall make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining the reason for its 
action, the amount of any increase or reduction, and the basis therefore. 
Idaho Code 6-807 ( emphasis supplied). The trial court abused its discretion. 
This is similar to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5)'s system for granting a new trial. If the verdict is such 
that it appears that the award was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice, then a 
new trial should be granted. See, e.g., Dineen v. Finch, lO0 Jdaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979). 
Here the evidence does not justify the verdict. 
In this case, the district court found that 'the verdict shocked the conscience of the Court 
because the verdict was excessively low given the nature and extent of the Plaintiffs 
permanent and debilitating injuries.' No one factor is appropriate to award a new trial or 
an additur because 'how substantial the disparity must be differs with each factual 
context and with the trialjudge's sense of fairness and justice.' Collins, 131 Idaho at 558, 
961 P.2d at 649 (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 769, 727 P.2d 1187, 1197 
(1986)). Moreover, Puckett did not need to prove that passion or prejudice affected 
the jury's verdict; the appearance alone was sufficient to justify a new trial or additur. 
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625-6, 603 P.2d 575, 580-1 (1979). Regarding the 
amount of the damage award, the district court stated that the jury was unduly prejudiced 
by testimony of Puckett's prior abuse of prescription medication. . ... We hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for an additur or new 
trial. 
Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937, (2007) (emphasis supplied). Although Dr. 
Harper's Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal discussed Puckett as a case strongly in support of 
a new trial or additur, Ms. Seamons does not mention this case in her brief; much less try to 
distinguish it. 
Ms. Seamons complains that Dr. Harper has not proved that there was passion or 
prejudice. However, as quoted above from Verska, I.R.C.P. 59.1 does not required that the Court 
(or trial court) determine what it was that inflamed passion or prejudice. 1t may be inferred from 
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miniscule medical expenses and zero general damages which the jury awarded. The party 
seeking relief from the judgment has no burden of proving the passion or prejudice. 
7. Improperly Defaced Exhibits Contributed to Unfairness. In Appellant's 
Opening Brief Dr. Harper pointed out that medical records exhibits, offered as being true copies, 
actually contained the taint of added written information. Examination of the exhibits after trial 
reveals that the copies that went to the jury included Ms. Seamons' interpretation and desired 
highlights of the exhibits, with editorial comments. Exhibit 663, the description of which states, 
"Note Dr. Rupp refused to testify." Indeed Dr. Rupp did not testify at trial, but that was not 
something which should have been allowed to influence the jury. This is prejudicial and 
improper, especially as part of purported medical treatment records. 
Ms. Seamons has made no effort to counter or explain this, and it is a separate reason for 
a new trial. When an attorney states that an exhibit consists of the medical records of a 
particular doctor, the judge and opposing counsel are entitled to rely on them actually being that 
physician's records. There is no reason to suspect that, as here, the records put in evidence 
would have highlights or comments by the defense. 
8. There Were Evidentiary Errors. I.R.C.P. 59(7) authorizes a new trial for errors 
of law and procedure. And IRCP 59(a)(6) allows a new trial "where the verdict is against the 
law." Together with the other errors of law and fact, the prejudicial evidence presented to the 
jury resulted in an unfair trial, justifying a new one. 
Licensure Evidence. In Appellant's Opening Brief, Dr. Harper presented the problem 
with the trial court having allowed the jury to hear extensive, one-sided testimony that he lost his 
license to be a state authorized/licensed counselor. Specifically, they heard that Dr. Harper had 
an elderly patient to whom he was ministering in his chaplain and counselor capacity, and that he 
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somehow influenced her to make large donations and/or gifts to him. Dr. Harper has another 
side to that story, but for present purposes it is enough that the jury heard those things, and heard 
that his license was revoked or suspended as a result. Even the specific Findings and Order 
detailing the scandalous matter were presented to the jury. Ms. Seamons' effort to counter the 
arguments on this issue are slim, and bereft of any legal authority. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. 
Even if it had some relevance (which Dr. Harper does not concede), relevant evidence is 
to be excluded if it is more prejudicial than probative. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical 
Center, 134 Idaho 46, 56, 995 P.2d 816, 826 (2000); Hawks v. EPI Products USA, Inc., 129 
Idaho 281, 286, 923 P .2d 988 (1996). Any relevance here was so miniscule as to make the 
shocking, negative nature of the information poisonous to a jury. It may explain the prejudice 
and passion that resulted in the awkward verdict. 
Dr. Harper stands on his previous Briefs argument against the notion that these 
documents, though never produced,3 were admissible as "impeachment." Appellant's Opening 
Brief@ 32. Ms Seamons' response to this, and to the fact these documents were never produced 
in evidence, is typified by the statement that somehow it's ok not to have produced them, 
because Dr. Harper must have known about it. 
Ms. Seamons argues that the limited licensure information had to be (and was) 
supplemented by the licensing agency's detailed findings and order of suspension, because Dr. 
and Mrs. Harper "continued to testify" about it. Respondent's Brief, p. 25. This is an odd, 
bootstrap argument. Under her theory, if highly prejudicial information comes in ( e.g. the 
mention of license revocation), the prejudiced party must stay silent in response. If he attempts 
to explain or rehabilitate himself, he will be deemed to have opened the door for far more 
3 Ms. Seamons comments that while the information may have been a surprise to counsel, Dr. Harper certainly knew 
of it. The rules of discovery would be adjudged nearly out of existence if a party could withhold matters just 
because the opposing party, but not his counsel, "knew" about them. 
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prejudicial evidence on the same subject matter (such as page after page of findings and order). 
If he tries to explain he will, as Dr. Harper was here, be punished with more detailed, graphic 
evidence on the same issue. 
Talk Show Video. The parties and Judge Goff seem to agree that one the most 
influential exhibits the jury saw, if not the most influential, was the Daystar' TV video of Dr. 
Harper being interviewed on a Denver religious program. Its admission, though rejected as an 
exhibit, and the failure to preserve it, becomes all important. It is not, and cannot be, part of the 
Record in this case. 
Ms. Seamons argues that the interview was admissible as some sort of impeachment, and 
that it was relevant because it showed Dr. Harper sharper and more alert than he appeared during 
much of the trial. Without doubt he was sharper in the high-adrenaline television interview than 
in a week and a half trial. He testified that, like most injured people, he has good and his bad 
days. 
In response to the problems raised about the exhibit showing as rejected in the Record, 
and not having been preserved, Ms. Seamons in her brief says "it is common practice" to show 
things to the jury without them being admitted into evidence. Respondent's Brief p. 26. She 
cites to no rule, statute or common law that approves such a practice. "Common practice" has 
never been usable authority. And of course the common practice is to show demonstrative 
exhibits, such as charts and summaries, to the jury. This is a far cry from that. 
The video was assigned exhibit number 765. It was not preserved. Clerk's Record. R. 
361. The Clerk's Record shows, on Defendant's Exhibit List, that the video, Exhibit 765, was 
not admitted into evidence. 
Ms. Seamons had no explanation or authority to counter the fact that the video was 
revealed for the first time in the heat of trial, and never produced in discovery. It was played 
during Dr. Harper's testimony, with no advance notice, and no opportunity to even ask for 
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redactions. Even if the propounding party were allowed to keep such evidence secret until time 
for use, certainly fair play requires that, as soon as they knew they were going to show the 
interview, they provide a copy to opposing counsel. 
Ms. Seamons' argument is essentially that that it is exempt from all rules of discovery 
and evidence, and from the Pretrial Orders' production and witness provisions, and that it need 
not be in the Record, just because it is "impeachment." This position is no more availing than a 
somewhat similar situation in Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 53, 
995 P.2d 816, 823 (2000). 
Perry is a medical malpractice case. The defendant hospital's psychiatrist had evaluated 
the injured plaintiff, and was prepared to testify that she had a character disorder which could 
cause her to fabricate her testimony if there was a financial gain involved. The Court confirmed 
that a trial court may exclude relevant testimony, if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Perry, supra, 134 Idaho 55. On that basis, it was 
appropriate to exclude the psychiatrist's testimony entirely, despite what sounds like strong 
relevance. And it was proper to exclude testimony that the plaintiff occasionally gave away 
some of her pain pills, again because such evidence was substantially more prejudicial than 
probative. Perry, supra, 134 Idaho 55-56. The video tape and the licensure information were 
evidence of that type: substantially more prejudicial than probative. 
Ms. Seamons' Brief makes much of Dr. Harper's drowsiness, contrasted with his 
performance on the video. Dr. Harper is prone to bouts of low energy and sleepiness, as noted in 
Exhibit 24a - pages 406-411, Dr. Em ens' report. Dr. Ernens is a sleep specialist. Dr. Harper is 
(and was at the relevant times) being treated for a sleep disorder, and is often lethargic. Id., p. 2 
(p. 406 of Exhibit 24a). Mention is made by Dr. Emens of his "excessive daytime somnolence 
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(drowsiness/sleepiness) and unintentional falling asleep (nodding off while listening to someone 
talk)." The last sentence notes that he is a "morning person." 
The Denver video shown in court was made in the morning, when he is more alert. His 
sleep disorder explains his demeanor at court. If the jury placed emphasis on this, it was error. 
Regardless of tl1e reason for the verdict, the jury did not follow the law, as discussed elsewhere 
in this Brief 
Ms. Seamons states that the critical mention by Dr. Harper with regard to gays, and 
commenting on religious matters, were "not inflammatory." Respondent's Brief, p. 26. How 
she is able to divine this, or make such a finding, is unclear. 
9. Admissible Doctor Letters Should Not Have Been Excluded. The letters of Dr. 
Garner, Beaver and Katz should have been admitted. They were not produced late, and they 
were part of medical records, entitled to be excepted from the hearsay rules. 
Their exclusion from evidence is not, as Ms. Seamons seems to claim (Response Brief, p. 
24), a harmless error. Their content brought the opinions of even the doctors who testified 
forward and updated them, affirming their opinions as to the nature and causation of Dr. 
Harper's injuries. This was vital on issues used to attack his various doctors on cross 
examination. 
10. Dr. Harper's Financial Circumstances Entitle Him to a Transcript, paid for 
by public funds. As noted above, there are bases on which the Court can overturn the verdict 
without reference to the transcript of the trial. Not the least of these is the fatally inconsistent 
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verdict form. But as to some aspects of this appeal, the parties truly are hindered by the inability 
of Dr. Harper to pay the $7,500 cost of a trial transcript.4 
As demonstrated in Appellant's Opening Brief, after trial Dr. Harper filed a Motion and 
Affidavit for Fee Waiver with the trial court. ROA 10. For some unknown reason the clerk 
never filed it. 5 When the District Court wanted more information, he filed his 
Plaintifjl Appellant's Amended Motion and Affidavit for Fee Waiver. ROA 10. This was not 
placed in the file either. These errors cumulate with the other problems in this case, to result in 
an unfair trial. The requests for waiver of fees on appeal were denied, without any findings. 
ROA 11. On April 13, 2011 Dr. Harper filed with this Court Appellant's Verified Motion for 
Waiver of Costs. See, DOA 10. It was denied on May 16, 2011 without explanation. 
Ms. Seamons filed no opposition to either of these applications for waiver, though her 
attorney did provide mild resistance at the hearing on the motion, which was held on March 30, 
2011. See transcript, ROA 11. Now, on appeal, her opposition is strident. 
The only evidence in the Record is that Dr. Harper makes under $900 per month, which 
does not cover his expenses. Ms. Seamons suggests, without there being any evidence to support 
it, that he could work a better job. However, he is a chaplain/religious counselor (receiving free 
will offerings when the counseled folks are able), and help run a Christian newspaper. Those are 
currently not profitable enterprises. The tax return is also uncontested, and shows similar low 
income. This includes his wife's income, and even considering that, he qualifies as impecunious 
under IAR 23 and Idaho Code 31-3220. 
He satisfies each of the factors in that statute. "Indigent" means one who "is found by the 
court to be unable to pay fees, costs or give security, for the purpose of prepayment fees, costs or 
4 Of course, as to issues raised by Ms. Seamons, she could have, and did not, provide a transcript. 
5 A file stamped copy was attached as Exhibit B to Dr. Harper's Appellant's Verified Motion.for Waiver o_[Costs, 
filed with this Court. 
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security in a civil action." Idaho Code 32-3220(1 )( d). The Court is invited to examine the 
motions and their attachments that formed his Ver[fied Motion for Waiver of Costs, and his 
Plaintt[f!Appellant's Amended Motion and Affidavit.for Fee Waiver. In Dr. Harper's Appellant's 
Opening Brief on Appeal he carefully treated each of the concerns Judge Greenwood raised in 
denying the motion to waive costs. Id., @pp. 14-15. Ms. Seamons gave that analysis little or no 
treatment in her Respondent's Brief 
Ms. Seamons makes the unsupported claim that it is improper for Dr. Harper to cite to 
exhibits ifthere is not a transcript. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. Respectfully, this is not the law. 
11. Respondent is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees or Costs. Dr. Harper fully 
expects to prevail on one or more of his Issues on Appeal. As such, there is no basis for Ms. 
Seamons' request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. But if she should happen to 
prevail, her only bases to claim fees are IAR 41, and Idaho Code 12-121. Respondent's Brfrf, p. 
27. 
The biggest issue on which she relies to claim fees is the inability of Dr. Harper to obtain 
a transcript. An indigent person should not be denied the right to appeal. To award attorney fees 
for this inability is to punish poverty. It does not require a transcript to see that the verdict is 
internally inconsistent. And as to indigence, Dr. Harper did provide a transcript of the hearing 
on waiver of costs. It doesn't require a transcript to show that the vital video played for the jury 
was not preserved, and was marked as not being admitted into evidence, and yet was played. 
Inability to provide a transcript should not serve as the basis for a finding that the appeal was 
frivolous. 
To try and gain fees, she makes the outlandish claim that this appeal was pursued to 
motivate this Court to grant the waiver of the transcript costs. This accusation is false and 
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unfounded. This appeal is pursued for reasons of justice, and to correct errors in the trial court. 
Such appropriate motives should not be discouraged by fee awards. 
An award of attorney fees may be granted under LC. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the 
prevailing party and such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the abiding 
belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. 
Page v. Pasquali, 244 P.3d 1336, 1239 (2010). 
Ms. Seamons relies heavily on the Karlson case for entitlement to fees. Karlson v. 
Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428 (2004). In that case a prose appeal, the appeal was without 
foundation, and was merely an invitation for the Court to second-guess the proceedings below. 
97 P.3d @437. It is not at all comparable to this case. 
Dr. Harper has solid points, with a good foundation, so no attorney fees are appropriate. 
"The Hospital brought some legitimate issues before this Court and did not pursue the appeal 
'frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.' LC. § 12-121. Therefore, this Court declines 
to award attorney fees on appeal to Perry." Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 
134 Idaho 46, 60, 995 P.2d 816 (2000). Even if some claim were deemed to be without 
foundation (which is denied), the rest are not. 
The district court should evaluate whether "all claims brought or all defenses asserted are 
frivolous or without foundation" before awarding attorney fees under LC. § 12-
121. Bingham v. Montane Resource Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 427, 987 P.2d 1035, 1042 
(1999). Puckett's claims were not all frivolous. 
Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937, 946 (2007). 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Seamons has been unable to explain adequately why the verdict as entered is valid. 
The jury, having found that her fault caused injury to Dr Harper, cannot reasonably award a tiny 
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amount for special damages and nothing for pain and suffering. With a verdict like that, Judge 
Goff should have granted a judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, a new trial, or additur. 
The admission of prejudicial, undisclosed evidence (the licensure sanction paperwork and 
the Denver interview video), and the exclusion of letters from medical providers, which were 
timely disclosed, also provide independent and adequate bases for granting a new trial. Further, 
the Record shows that the video was not received in evidence; yet it was played to the jury. Ms. 
Seamons failed to preserve this evidence,6 and it cannot be reviewed by this Court. 
Dr. Harper is impecunious, and the trial court ( and this one) should have waived the 
requirement that he pay for transcripts on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of November, 201 L 
PURNELL LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
I /'I 1 ) !}j (.,YA ;j 
By:,~ J//fl 
David R. Purnell, of the Firm 
6 Ironically, if the defense had provided a copy of the evidence as required by the rules and the Pretrial Order, there 
would have been a preserved copy. 
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